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One might assume that the answer to the rhetorical question
posed in the title of this Article would be both obvious and in the
affirmative. But it depends on whom one asks. Surprisingly, many
Catholic leaders have expressed strong reservations about universities1
making employment-related decisions on the basis of religion. Fre-
quently mentioned is the concern that lawsuits will arise if a school
engages in employment discrimination on religious grounds.2
The question of whether a religious employer may discriminate
on religious grounds in its employment practices has become even
more important since June 1, 2002. That date, selected by the U.S.
Catholic bishops in November 1999, was the deadline by which all
theologians at Catholic universities in the United States were to have
obtained a mandatum ("mandate," in English) from the bishop of the
diocese where the school's president and central administration of-
fices are located.3 The mandatum requirement, which is essentially an
acknowledgment by ecclesial authority that a Catholic professor of a
theological discipline is teaching "in communion with the Catholic
* Law Clerk for the Hon. John L. Coffey, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit; Adjunct Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; B.A., 1987,
University of St. Thomas; M.A., 1994, Notre Dame Institute; J.D., 1999, Marquette
University Law School.
1 Throughout this Article, I will use the term "universities" to refer to any col-
lege, university, or other institution of higher learning that offers instruction and sup-
ports research leading to the conferral of an academic degree.
2 See, e.g., Responses to Proposed Ordinances by the Association of Catholic Colleges and
Universities, 23 ORIGINS 614 (1994) (noting "fears" by Catholic academicians concern-
ing the legality of hiring preferences).
3 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Cuidelines Concerning the Aca-
demic Mandatum in Catholic Universities (Canon 812), 31 ORIGINS 128, 129 (2001) [here-
inafter USCCB Guidelines]; see also Michael Rust, Holy Reform in Higher Ed, INSIGHT ON
THE NEWS (Feb. 21, 2000), at http://www.insightmag.com/main.cfm?include=detail&
storyid=208374.
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Church," applies to some 3000 Catholic theologians at the 235 Catho-
lic universities in this country, and has generated a furious debate
within and outside the Church.4 The eventual impact of the require-
ment on the hiring and retention of theology instructors is an open
question.
5
Teachers, administrators, and even bishops have voiced concerns
about this most recent attempt by church leaders to link employment
decisions with religious or doctrinal considerations. Prominent theo-
logians Monika Hellwig and Fr. Peter Phan are among the many
professors worried that some theologians may lose their jobs over this
issue. 1 Officials at Jesuit-sponsored Boston College and Marquette
University have evinced similar angst,7 and at least some of those
charged with implementing the requirement-i.e., the bishops-are
reported to have only "reluctantly" supported the rules and are con-
cerned that making a mandatum a condition of employment would
expose the colleges and the bishops themselves to civil lawsuits., Cin-
cinnati Archbishop Daniel E. Pilarczyk, chairman of the committee
charged with developing procedures for granting the mandate, was
quoted as saying the mandatum requirement was "an ecclesiological
4 SeeJ. Michael Parker, School Officials Discuss Response to Vatican, SAN ANTONIO
ExPREss-NEws, Aug. 26, 1999, at IB; Nolan Zavoral, Catholic Bishops Stir a Vigorous Cam-
pus l)ebate, MINNAPOIuS STAR-TRI.,Jtune 25, 2001, at Al. The mandatum requirement
applies only to Catholics teaching Catholic theological disciplines at Catholic universi-
ties. See USCCB Guidelines, supra note 3, at 129.
5 See, e.g., D.R. Whitt, "What We Have Here Is a Failure to Communicate": The Mind of
the Legislator in Ex Corde Ecclesiae, 25 J.C. & U.L. 769, 797-98 (1999) (noting that
"unless the higher education institution itself requires that one obtain a mandate or
retain it as a condition of employment, the acquisition or retention of the mandate is
irrelevant to gaining or keeping a faculty position").
6 Arlene Levinson, Catholic Theologians Come to Terms with Mandates, ST. PAUL PIo-
NEER PRESS, June 1, 2002, at 10E.
7 See Maria Figueras, Wild Challenges Vatican Vision fir University Identity, MARQ.
TRIB., Feb. 16, 1999, at I (quoting Marquette University president Fr. Robert Wild's
concern that "[t] he requirement that Catholics who are hired by Catholic universities
be faithful could present a 'legal basis for a lawsuit against the university and the
church"'); Dina Gerdeman, Bishops Want Voice in Colleges' Hiring, PATRIOT LEDGER
(Quincy, Mass.), Mar. 24, 1999, at IA (describing anxieties of Boston College officials
over the prospect of employment discrimination lawsuits if preferential hiring was
implemented); see also Hanna Rosin & Caryle Murphy, Bishops Tighten Academic Con-
trol, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1999, at A] (describing concerns among Catholic academi-
cians that the new guidelines would lead to employment-related lawsuits as well as a
loss of government funding for Catholic universities).
8 SeeJeffery L. Sheler, Guarding the Doctrine: Catholic Bishops Move To Rein in Aca-
demics, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 25, 2001, at 52.
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matter .... [It has] nothing to do with hiring or firing of tenured
professors."'
Such expressions of concern are not universally well-received.
On the contrary, some commentators have criticized administrators of
Catholic universities for advertising the "Catholic nature" of their in-
stitutions to new students and donors on one hand, while, on the
other, claiming that the civil law prevents them from hiring faculty
who are committed to the institution's Catholic heritage and mis-
sion.' Even non-Catholics have expressed support for the mandatum
initiative, opining that many erstwhile Protestant institutions of higher
learning lost their religious identities once employment decisions
were made without regard to religion. Kent Hill, president of the
Protestant Eastern Nazarene College in Quincy, Massachusetts, stated
it this way: "The pope is on the money. You can't have a Catholic
school if the majority of the faculty isn't Catholic-and seriously Cath-
olic .... If you lose control over the faculty, there is no question that
the school will not remain faithful to its religious connections."'
Other writers have suggested that narrowly defining the term
"catholic" and making parochial employment decisions would dis-
credit Catholic theologians in the eyes of their peers, inhibit innova-
tive scholarship, and discourage bright students from entering the
field. Jon Nilson, Loyola theology professor and incoming president
of the Catholic Theological Society of America, said he was "troubled
about moving forward with this new juridical instrument that has this
potential for damage."' 2 DePaul religious studies professor Jeffrey
Carlson added: "In the university we proceed from the idea that no
idea stands alone .... Certainly one of the voices should be the offi-
9 Stephen Huba, Accepted Theology at Heart of Debate, CINCINNATI POST, Nov. 21,
2000, at 16A.
10 See, e.g., GEORGE WEIGEL, THE COURACE To BE CATHOLIC 211 (2002) (chastis-
ing the American bishops for their lengthy delay in "getting national norms with real
traction for implementing Ex Corde Ecclesiae"); E. MICHAEL JONES, JOHN CARDINAL
KROL AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 377-410 (1994) (chronicling efforts by individ-
uals inside and outside the Catholic Church to decrease Vatican influence over Amer-
ican Catholic universities); GEORGE A. KELLY, THE BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN CHURCH
59-97 (1979) (arguing that administrators of several prominent Catholic universities
in the United States have consciously attempted to remove their institutions from
Church control).
11 Gerdeman, supra note 7; see also GEORGE MARSDEN, THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY: FROM PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT TO ESTABLISHED NONBELIEF 5 (1994)
(maintaining that religiously affiliated universities in this country drifted to secular-
ism rather than being moved in that direction by conscious design).
12 Julia Lieblich, Catholic Colleges Mum on Teacher "Loyalty Oath", CHI. TRIB.,June 7,
2002, at 6.
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cial teachings developed by the magisterium of the Catholic
Church.... But we invite students to consider multiple candidates for
truth." i'
This Article debunks the myth that civil law hamstrings adminis-
trators at Catholic universities when they make personnel decisions
with respect to professors of theology or professors in general. Part I
discusses the obligations that administrators of Catholic universities
have under the laws of the Catholic Church, which authoritatively re-
quire administrators to discriminate on religious grounds in the area
of employment. 14 Part II presents the basis for a sound defense
against religious discrimination claims, as existing law provides sub-
stantial protection against such suits. Part III examines the holdings
of several cases to show that Catholic universities need not fear ad-
verse legal consequences if they abide by Canon Law. On the con-
trary, it is the retreat from ecclesial authority that poses the greatest
threat of employment-related liability to the Catholic universities of
this country.
I. CATHOI IC HIGHER EDucATION AND CHURCH LAW
Having launched the major universities in Europe seven centu-
ries ago, 15 the Catholic Church has considerable experience in the
field of higher education. The tool by which the Church sees to the
administration of these institutions is known as the Code of Canon
Law (hereinafter "the Code"). The most recent version of the Code,
revised in 1983, states that "[t] he Church has the right to erect and to
supervise universities which contribute to a higher level of human cul-
ture, to a fuller advancement of the human person and also to the
fulfillment of the Church's teaching office."' 1 The Code goes on to
require universities to secure the permission of the "competent eccle-
siastical authority" before it can bear the title or name "Catholic
university." 17
Beyond these general principles, the Code also bears on employ-
ment decisions. Canon 810 of the Code provides as follows:
It is the responsibility of the authority who is competent ill accord
with the statutes to provide for the appointment of teachers to Cath-
13 Id.
14 See 1983 CODE cc.807-14 (covering "Catholic Universities and Other Institutes
of Higher Studies").
15 See I EDWARD MCNALL BURNS, WESTERN CIVILIZATIONS: THEIR HISTORY AND
TiiEIR CULTURE 330 (8th ed. 1973).
16 1983 CODE c.807.
17 Id. c.808 (emphasis omitted).
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olic universities who besides their scientific and pedagogical suita-
bility are also outstanding in their integrity of doctrine and probity
of life; when those requisite qualities are lacking they are to be re-
moved from their positions in accord with the procedure set forth
in the statutes. 8
Seven years after the promulgation of the revised Code, on Au-
gust 15, 1990, Pope John Paul II released a document on Catholic
higher education entitled Ex Corde Ecclesiae.19 In it, he asserts that
Catholic institutions of higher learning are born "from the heart of
the Church,"21 and that their privileged task is "to unite existentially
by intellectual effort two orders of reality that too frequently tend to
be placed in opposition as though they were antithetical: the search
for truth and the certainty of already knowing the fount of truth."
2 1
The Pope continues: "It is the honor and responsibility of a Catholic
university to consecrate itself without reserve to the cause of truth."
2 2
Ex Corde Ecclesiae contains a number of specific provisions re-
ferred to as "general norms."2 3 The document describes these norms
as being "a further development of the Code of Canon Law" and
"valid for all Catholic Universities and other Catholic Institutes of
Higher Studies throughout the world." 2 4 The norms are "to be ap-
plied concretely at the local and regional levels by Episcopal Confer-
ences . . . in conformity with the Code of Canon Law."2 5
Article four of the general norms bears directly on the employ-
ment practices of a Catholic university. Beginning with the principle
that "[t]he identity of a Catholic University is essentially linked to the
quality of its teachers and to respect for Catholic doctrine," 26 the Pope
goes on to list several specific requirements. First, "[a] I1 teachers and
all administrators, at the time of their appointment, are to be in-
formed about the Catholic identity of the Institution and its implica-
tions, and about their responsibility to promote, or at least to respect,
18 Id. c.810, § 1. Canon 812 goes even farther, requiring those teaching "theolog-
ical disciplines" to have "a mandate from the competent ecclesiastical authority." Id.
c.812.
19 See JOHN PAUL 11, Ex CORDE ECCLESIAE [THE APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTION ON
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITIES] (1990), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-
paul-ii/apostsconstitutions/documents/hfjp-ii-apc_15081990_ex-corde-ecclesiae_
en.html.
20 Id. Intro., 1.
21 Id.
22 Id. Intro., 4.
23 Id. pt. II.
24 Id. pt. 1I, art. 1, § 1.
25 Id. pt. II, art. 1, § 2.
26 Id. pt. I, art. 4, § 1.
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that identity." 7 Second, all teachers at the institution who are Catho-
lic "are to be faithful to . . . Catholic doctrine and morals in their
research and teaching."28 This same provision requires even more of
Catholic theologians, who, "aware that they fulfill a mandate received
from the Church, are to be faithful to the Magisterium of the Church
as the authentic interpreter of Sacred Scripture and Sacred Tradi-
tion."2 - Third, all other teachers-defined as those "who belong to
other Churches, ecclesial communities, or religions, as well as those
who profess no religious belief"""- are to "respect Catholic doctrine
and morals in their research and teaching,"3' as well as "recognize and
respect the distinctive Catholic identity of the University."3 2 Fourth,
"[i]n order not to endanger the Catholic identity of the University or
Institute of Higher Studies, the number of non-Catholic teachers
should not be allowed to constitute a majority within the Institution,
which is and must remain Catholic."3"
Neither these provisions in Canon Law nor the general norms of
Ex Corde Ecclesiae have been received well on this side of the Atlantic.
Many critics of Ex Corde Ecclesiae note that these provisions are broad
in scope, applying to all professors, not just those in theology depart-
ments. Indeed, the authors of a commentary accompanying a popu-
lar translation of the Code wondered whether Canon Law was even
applicable to Catholic universities in the United States because the
institutions "are both distinctive and diverse in character."3 4 The
same authors claimed "it is difficult if not impossible to apply the ca-
nons as such to such divergent situations of the Catholic universities
in the Fifty States of the United States,"35 and that "it is evident that
the canons are designed for systems of higher education in situations
considerably different from those in North America."
36
Administrators for American Catholic universities have worried
that implementing the requirements articulated in Ex Corde Ecclesiae
and Canon Law regarding employment would subject their institu-
tions to civil liability. Boston College president Fr. William Leahy, S.J.,
27 Id. pt. 11, art. 4, § 2.
28 Id. pt. II, art. 4, § 3.
29 Id.
30 Id. pt. 1I, art. 4, § 4.
31 Id. pt. 1I, art. 4, § 3.
32 Id. pt. 11, art. 4, § 4.
33 Id.
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objected to the idea that a majority of his faculty should be "faithful
Catholics," and was quoted as saying "he does not know how many
members of his faculty are Catholic because he doesn't ask them their
religion. '37 Father John Moder, president of St. Mary's University in
San Antonio, cautioned that "[i]f we recast our governing documents
according to 'Ex Corde Ecclesiae,' we could find ourselves held to
impossibly high standards by American courts," and warned that the
bishops might be forced to share responsibility for any legal judgment
against a Catholic university. 38 Fr. Robert Wild, S.J., president of the
Jesuit-sponsored Marquette University in Milwaukee, expressed his
fear that implementing Ex Corde Ecclesiae might present a "legal basis
for a lawsuit against the university and the church."3" Wild also as-
serted that he was not alone in his concerns: "lots of university presi-
dents are uncomfortable" about the national implementation of Ex
Corde Ecclesiae.
411
Numerous professors appear to be upset, as well, and, like their
administrative brethren, offer their legal opinion on the issue. Uni-
versity of Dayton theology professor Terrence Tilley, one of four con-
sultants to the U.S. Catholic Bishops' Committee on the
implementation of the mandatum requirement, warned that Universi-
ties that make the mandatum a condition for tenure or employment
for theology professors could be in violation of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.41 Fr. Peter Phan, a professor at the Catholic University of
America and president of the Catholic Theological Society of
America, worries that "expensive lawsuits against the bishops and the
colleges and universities" may arise if the mandatum requirement is
not reversed.
4 2
Why administrators and faculty members should be so wary of
certain threshold requirements for professors is unclear. Some pre-
requisites to employment are already in place: professors must have
the appropriate academic credentials, be engaged in published schol-
arship, etc. In an institution that purports to be infused with a relig-
ious vision, can it be illegal to require more of an employee, in order
37 Gerdeman, supra note 7.
38 Parker, supra note 4.
39 Figueras, supra note 7.
40 Id.
41 See Huba, supra note 9; see alsoJeff Gelman, Area Catholic Colleges Optimistic over
Norms, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Nov. 17, 1999, at Al (citing concern of University
of Scranton theology professor Richard Rousseau that a lawsuit may arise if a bishop
refuses to grant a mandatum to a professor and "it affects his status at [the] school").
42 Peter C. Pham, This Too Shall Pass: Wty Ex Corde's Mandate Won't Last, Coii-
MONWEAL, Dec. 21, 2001, at 13.
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that the unique mission of the institution survive? What if the em-
ployee happens to teach theology, a discipline in which the governing
body has a particularly strong interest?
The next part of this Article addresses these questions.
II. CATIIOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION AND REILIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
There are at least two defenses to federal causes of action 43
brought by disaffected employees of Catholic universities who allege
religious discrimination. One is based on the statutory protection af-
forded by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; the other is rooted in the
constitutional protection of the free exercise of one's religion under
the First Amendment. Following the basic judicial principle that a
court will not address constitutional issues if a case can be resolved on
statutory grounds,44 this Article will address the two defenses in the
order in which a court would most likely address them: first the statu-
tory exemption, then the constitutional exemption.
A. Title VII Exemption
Title VII allows educational institutions to discriminate in em-
ployment if certain conditions are met. The general exemption reads
as follows:
This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the
employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corpora-
tion, association, educational institution, or society with respect to
the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform
work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, associa-
tion, educational institution, or society of its activities. 4-5
43 Defenses to actions brought under state anti-discrimination statutes are cov-
ered below. See infra Parts I.B & II.C.
44 See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979) ("[A]n Act
of Congress ought not to be construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible
construction remains .... (citations omitted) (discussing Chief justice Marshall's
holding in Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117-18 (1804))).
45 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I(a) (2000). The constitutionality of this exemption was
scrutinized in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). In Amos, the
Court held that the exemption in Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat.
255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (2000)), did not run afotul of the
Establishment Clause. Applying the Lemon test, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612-13 (1971), the majority found that the law had a secular purpose, Amos, 483 U.S.
at 336, did not have the primary effect of advancing religion (though it did "afford a
uniform benefit to all religions"), id. at 339, and that it did not impermissibly entan-
gle church and state, as it "effectuates a more complete separation of the two and
avoids ... intrusive inquiry into religious belief." Id. The Court chose not to opine
1336 [VOL. 78:4
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The exemption aimed specifically at educational institutions
provides,
[I] t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, col-
lege, university, or other educational institution or institution of
learning to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if
such school, college, university, or other educational institution or
institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, sup-
ported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a par-
ticular religious corporation, association, or society .... 41
A third exemption, which functions as an affirmative defense, 47
applies when an employee's religion is a bona fide occupational
qualification:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
hire and employ employees ... on the basis of his religion, sex, or
national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or na-
tional origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise.
48
These three exemptions may overlap; thus, employers can use
them as alternative defenses. 49 When interpreting these exemptions,
it is necessary to determine (1) whether a particular institution is a
"religious" one or is "owned, supported, controlled, or managed" by a
religion or religious body,5 11 and (2) whether the alleged victim has
suffered religious discrimination.
5 1
on the impact of the other religion clause, declaring that it had "no occasion to pass
on the argument . . . that the exemption . . . [was] required by the Free Exercise
Clause." Id. at 339 n.17.
46 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2). For an entertaining and exhaustive summary of the
legislative history of the Title VII exemption (e) (2), see Robert John Araujo, "The
Harvest Is Plentiful, but the Laborers Are Few": Hiring Practices and Religiously Affiliated
Universities, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 713, 742-54 (1996).
47 SeeJoanne C. Brant, "Our Shield Belongs to the Lord": Religious Employers and a
Constitutional Right To Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 275, 285 (1994) (offering
a brief overview of Title VII).
48 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
49 See Brant, supra note 47, at 284; see also Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 803 F.2d
351 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the university's resolution to reserve vacancies in
tenure-track teaching positions for Jesuits did not violate Title VII because having a
Jesuit presence in the philosophy department justified a bona fide occupational
qualification).
50 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
51 See Pime, 803 F.2d at 354 (Posner, J., concurring) (arguing that plaintiff was not
discriminated against because he was Jewish, but because he was not a member of the
Jesuit order).
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In at least three situations, the argument that a religious school is
exempt under Title VII may not afford the school the protection it may
otherwise expect. The first situation is when a court applies a Title VII
statutory exemption to only some of a school's hiring practices. For
example, in EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary,52 a fed-
eral appellate court refused to exempt from Title VII a church-con-
trolled institution of higher learning in its hiring practices of support
staff.5" The court did allow, however, for such discrimination in the
institution's hiring of certain other employees because of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause.
5 4
The second situation when a school will not enjoy protection
under Title VII's exemption for religious institutions is when the
school is not sufficiently religious. In a concurring opinion in Pime v.
Loyola University of Chicago,55 Judge Richard A. Posner questioned
whether Loyola fit the qualifications of a "religious employer" under
§ 2000e-2(e) (2).5c He noted that while "the degree of religious in-
volvement in universities popularly considered to be religiously affili-
ated is highly variable, neither the statute nor the legislative history
indicates where in the continuum Congress wanted to make the
cut.15 7 He went on to warn,
If Loyola, perhaps in order to attract financial or other support
from non-Catholic sources has attenuated its relationship to the Jes-
uit order far beyond that of other Catholic universities, there would
be a serious problem in holding that it could nevertheless discrimi-
nate freely in favor of Catholics; for remember that the exemption
allows the religious employer to confine all hiring to members of one
religious faith.
58
The third situation in which a religious school may not benefit
from Title VII's religious exemption is when a plaintiff sues under not
a federal, but a state civil rights law that has no exemption for religious
institutions.59- For instance, in Porth v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
52 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981).
53 See id. at 287.
54 See id. at 281; see also Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 175-77 (5th Cir. 1999).
55 Pime, 803 F.2d at 354 (Posner, J., concurring).
56 Id. at 357-58 (Posner, J., concurring).
57 Id. at 358 (Posner, j., concurring) (citation omitted).
58 Id. (Posner, j., concurring) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
59 Compare Speer v. Presbyterian Children's Home & Serv. Agency, 824 S.W.2d
589, 598 (Tex. App. 1991) (holding that a church-related child care agency was enti-
tled to an exemption in a state civil rights law), vacated on other grounds by 847 S.W.2d
227 (Tex. 1993), with Porth v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Kalamazoo, 532 N.W.2d
195, 197-98 (Mich. 1995) (holding that Michigan's anti-discrimination law had no
religiots exemption).
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Kalamazoo,"" a Protestant teacher sued the Catholic diocese that oper-
ated the Catholic elementary school where she was employed under a
Michigan anti-discrimination statute. 61 The fourth and fifth grade
teacher alleged that she had been terminated for religious reasons,
even though her primary responsibility was to teach secular subjects
such as math, reading, science, and social studies. 62 Pursuant to a new
school policy of hiring only Catholic teachers, the school informed
the teacher that her contract for the 1991-1992 school year would not
be renewed because she was not Catholic.
6 3
The Michigan Supreme Court acknowledged both that this was a
case of obvious religious discrimination, 64 and that while the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 clearly contained an express exemption for relig-
ious schools, the state civil rights act did not contain a similar exemp-
tion.6 5 Nevertheless, the court held that the federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act6" (hereinafter "RFRA") barred enforcement
of the state anti-discrimination law.6
7
Congress enacted RFRA with the express purpose of "restor[ing]
the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guaran-
tee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion has been
substantially burdened. '6 8 Congress was reacting to the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith,69 which many
observers claimed had scaled back the protection that had tradition-
ally been available under the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause.7 1 Under RFRA, a "person whose religious exercise has been
burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a
claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate re-
lief against a government." 7 1 RFRA provides that the government
"shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability" unless the gov-
ernment demonstrates that application of the burden to the person
"(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2)
60 Porth, 532 N.W.2d at 195.
61 See id. at 197.
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 See id. at 198.
65 See id. (interpreting MICii. COmp. LAws § 37.2202 (1985)).
66 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000).
67 See Porth, 532 N.W.2d at 198.
68 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1).
69 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
70 See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
71 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-I (c).
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is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmen-
tal interest."
72
The Michigan state court in the Porth case reasoned that because
RFRA restored strict scrutiny to free exercise claims, affording the
school more protection than that available under the First Amend-
ment,73 the state had to show a "compelling interest" before it could
enforce its anti-discrimination law against the school.74 The court
found no such interest, explaining that religion "pervades all aspects
of a church-operated school," even the teaching of secular subjects. 75
The court stated that the teacher's responsibilities were "inexorably
intertwined with the primary function of defendant's school, which is
the education of its students consistent with the Catholic faith." 76 En-
forcing the state's anti-discrimination law to teaching positions in re-
ligious schools would, the court concluded, "detrimentally affect the
operation of such schools. '77 Thus, the court affirmed the trial
court's summary judgment in favor of the Catholic school. 7
Would Porth be decided the same way today? In light of the Su-
preme Court's 1997 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,79 striking down
RFRA as it applied to state governments, RFRA is no longer available
as a defense in the way it was available to the diocese in Porth.811 Fur-
72 Id. § 2000bb-1.
73 See Porth v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Kalamazoo, 532 N.W.2d 195, 199
(Mich. 1995).





79 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
80 Whether RFRA still applies to the federal government, however, is an open
question. In City of Boerne, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that RFRA still
applied to the federal government. See id. at 516. At least two federal appellate courts
have held that RFRA still applies to the federal government. See Kikumura v. Hurley,
242 F.3d 950, 953 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff had a "substantial likeli-
hood" of success in proving that a prison warden's denial of a pastoral visit violated
RFRA); Christians v: Ciystal Evangelical Free Church (In reYoung), 141 F.3d 854, 856
(8th Cir. 1998) (ruling that RFRA prevents the recovery of a debtor's religious tithes
as "avoidable transactions" in bankruptcy proceedings). This conclusion is not univer-
sal, however. See, e.g., La Voz Radio de la Communidad v. FCC, 223 F.3d 313, 319
(6th Cir. 20(10) (expressing "doubt" that RFRA is still constitutional as applied to fed-
eral law); United States v. Indianapolis Baptist Temple, 224 F.3d 627, 629 n.1 (7th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1112 (2001) (noting that while RFRA's constitutionality as
applied to the federal government was "not without doubt," it would "assume [RFRA]
is constitutional" when the parties did not dispute its constitutionality); see alo Greg-
ory P. Magarian, How To Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Federal Law Without
Violating the Constitution, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1903 (2001) (exploring how the RFRA fits
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thermore, commentators disagree on whether the strict scrutiny stan-
dard should be applied to free exercise claims arising under a Title
VII exemption."1 A free exercise defense would also offer a defendant
a significant amount of protection from the application of a state anti-
discrimination law.82 Thus, we turn now to an examination of relig-
ious exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause.
B. The Free Exercise Clause
Before 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court generally used a four-step
analysis when evaluating free exercise claims under the First Amend-
ment to the Constitution.83 Courts relied on this strict standard when
adjudicating Tide VII disputes.84 Claimants had to (1) prove that the
regulated or prohibited practice or conduct was motivated by or
stemmed from sincerely held religious beliefs, and (2) demonstrate
that the state regulation actually burdened those practices. 85 It was
then up to the state to show that (3) a "compelling state interest"justi-
fled the burden on the belief in question, and (4) the burden was the
"least restrictive means" of achieving that interest.8 6
In Employment Division v. Smith,87 the Supreme Court held that
the Free Exercise Clause was not violated when a state denied unem-
ployment benefits to a person who, for religious reasons, violated a
state ban on use of the drug peyote. 8 The Court held that the Clause
was not violated when the burden placed on a religious practice was
into the constitutional scheme of governmental power and how courts should pro-
ceed in construing it).
81 Compare Ralph D. Mawdsley, Issues Facing Religious Educational Institutions That
Discriminate on the Basis of Religion, 97 EDuc. L. REP. 15, 27 (1995) (proposing an "own-
ership/control-plus" test by which "only educational institutions owned or controlled
by a religious organization" would be protected under Title VII, and then only for
those positions which are "actively involved in the ... organization's religious mis-
sion"), with Brant, supra note 47, at 308-10 (arguing that Title VII and its religious
exemptions are "neutral laws of general applicability within the meaning of Smith").
82 See, e.g., Montrose Christian Sch. Corp. v. Walsh, 770 A.2d 111, 129 (Md. 2001)
(striking down a cotunty anti-discrimination ordinance tinder a strict scrutiny analysis
on the grounds that it violated the Free Exercise Clause).
83 See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
84 See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164
(4th Cir. 1985) (refusing to subject to judicial review a church's selection of pastors);
Feldstein v. Christian Sci. Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974 (D. Mass. 1983) (allowing relig-
ious publisher to require adherence to church's beliefs).
85 See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716-18.
86 1I. at 718.
87 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
88 See id. at 890.
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not the object of the government, but simply an "incidental effect" of
a "neutral and generally applicable" law.89 The Court stated that "the
mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant
concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the
discharge of political responsibilities. '" 91 Thus, the Court concluded,
such general laws will not be subject to strict scrutiny under the Free
Exercise Clause.9 1
In the wake of the Smith decision, persons claiming that their free
exercise rights have been violated carry a heavier burden than they
did under the previous line of cases. As state non-discrimination laws
seem to be religiously neutral and generally applicable, it might ap-
pear that religious institutions have no right to discriminate in their
employment decisions.92
There are at least two responses to this theory. First, it is not clear
that Smith would necessarily apply to a church qua a religious entity.
In other words, just because a person (e.g., a peyote-smoker) who seeks
to avoid application of a "neutral and generally applicable law" may
no longer demand strict scrutiny of that law post-Smith, it does not
follow that a religious employer (e.g., a Catholic university) is in a similar
position. After all, an exception to an employment-related law is not
invoked by an individual seeking to protect an alleged right to observe
a religious command or practice, but, at least arguably, by an organiza-
tion seeking to protect its identity. Thus, the fear noted in Smith-i.e.,
that individuals professing religious belief may "become a law unto
themselves"9 .- does not appear to be germane to the issue of relig-
ious employers making hiring decisions. Nor would judges, in analyz-
ing the hiring practices of religious institutions, be required to
determine "the 'centrality' of an individual's religious beliefs before
applying a 'compelling interest' test in the free exercise field."94 On
these grounds, then, a strong argument may be made that Smith
should not affect the manner in which religious employers defend
themselves against employment discrimination suits.'
5
89 Id. at 878.
90 Id. (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95
(1940)).
91 See id. at 882.
92 See generally Laura B. Mutterperl, Note, Employment at (Gods) Will: The Constitu-
tionality of Anti-Discrimination Exemptions in Charitable Choice Legislation, 37 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 389 (2002) (arguing that when religious organizations choose to accept
government funds, they alter their status tinder constitutional and statutory anti-dis-
crimination provisions and forfeit their Title VII exemption).
93 Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
94 Id. at 887.
95 See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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Assuming arguendo that the converse is true, and that Smith
raises the bar for employers wishing to claim a right to discriminate on
religious grounds, an exception appearing in the Smith decision itself
provides the means by which strict scrutiny may still apply. The Smith
Court rejected the Native Americans' claims in part because their free
exercise claims were "unconnected with any communicative activity or
parental right. ' 96 Thus, Smith allows for strict scrutiny when a claim-
ant couples a free exercise right with some "other constitutional pro-
tections. '97 Such. a "hybrid" claim would seem to allay the concern of
the Smith Court that anarchy would result if citizens could disobey
laws with impunity if they but claimed that the laws violated their relig-
ious beliefs.
98
Though Smith's "hybrid" analysis has come under fire, it is still in
wide use today.99 In his concurrence in Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,0° ° Justice Souter stated his view that the
hybrid approach in Smith was "ultimately untenable":"" 1
If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right
is implicated, then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast
as to swallow the Smith rule, and, indeed, the hybrid exception
would cover the situation exemplified by Smith, since free speech
and associational rights are certainly implicated in the peyote-smok-
ing ritual. But if a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would
actually obtain an exemption from a formally neutral, generally ap-
plicable law under another constitutional provision, then there
would have been no reason for the Court in what Smith calls the
hybrid cases to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.1
1 2
Justice Souter's obvious frustration with Smith has sounded an
echo in several federal courts of appeal, including the Second,"1 3
96 Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
97 Id. at 881.
98 See id.
99 See, e.g., Swanson ex rel. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. l-L, 135 F.3d
694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998) (requiring a claimant alleging a free exercise violation to
link that claim to a colorable claim of infringement of a companion constitutional
right); Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 467 (same); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods.,
68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995) (same).
100 508 U.S. 520 (1992).
101 Id. at 567 (Souter, J., concurring).
102 Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
103 See Knight v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2001)
(holding that the language in Smith relating to hybrid claims was "dicta and not bind-
ing on this court").
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Sixth, 11 4 and Ninth'1 5 Circuits. Notwithstanding the above, as courts
today frequently employ Smith's hybrid framework,1 " it is important
to undertake a hybrid inquiry.
There are at least four ways religious institutions could establish a
hybrid claim in the employment discrimination context. First, they
could argue that they stand in loco parentis,117 and that the govern-
ment cannot interfere with the "liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their con-
trol."'11 8 If, as the Michigan Supreme Court noted in Porth, religious
schools were forbidden from hiring and firing their teachers on relig-
ious grounds, the fundamental purpose of the school-i.e., to educate
and form children within a particular tradition-would be frustrated.
By linking this parental right claim, which the Smith court specifically
recognized, 109 to their free exercise claim, schools might secure strict
scrutiny of any law requiring them not to discriminate in employment
matters. Given the widespread understanding that the doctrine of in
loco parentis no longer applies at the college level, 1 0 however, this ar-
gument might be more persuasive at the grade or high school level
rather than the post-secondary level.
A free exercise claim might also be conjoined to a free speech
right. A university may argue, for example, that having to make em-
ployment decisions without regard to Catholic principles may send a
message to the public that the institution does not wish to convey. In
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,"'I the
U.S. Supreme Court held that organizers of a St. Patrick's Day parade
could not be forced by a Massachusetts law to allow a group with a
104 See Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (terming as "illogi-
cal" the position that "the legal standard tinder the Free Exercise Clause depends on
whether a free-exercise claim is coupled with other constitutional rights").
105 See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1147-48 (9th
Cir. 2000) (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) (opining that Smith "is fraught with complex-
ity both in doctrine and in practice," and expressing the hope that the Supreme
Court would "refine its approach in this area").
106 See supra note 99.
107 See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535-36 (1925) (granting a Catholic
school standing to complain of unwarranted interference with the constitutional
rights of parents).
108 Id. at 534-35; see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000) (striking down
a state law giving judges the authority to determine child visitation rights over paren-
tal objections on the grounds that the law violated the parents' rights tinder the Four-
teenth Amendment to control the upbringing of their children).
109 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
110 See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 138-39 (3d Cir. 1979); McNeil v.
Wagner Coll., 667 N.Y.S.2d 397, 398 (App. Div. 1998).
111 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
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message not endorsed by the organizers to march in the parade.'1 2
The Court held that such compulsion violated the parade organizers'
right to free speech under the First Amendment.I "
A third method of establishing a hybrid claim is to link the right
to expressive association guaranteed by the First Amendment to a free
exercise claim. Two recent cases illustrate a growing understanding of
the right to expressive association guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment and the way in which an organization may discriminate incident
to the exercise of such a right. In Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,' " the U.S.
Supreme Court found that the state of Minnesota had a compelling
interest in eradicating sex discrimination, and that such an interest
trumped the Jaycees' desire to exclude women from certain member-
ship classes. '15 The Court justified its holding on the basis that the
Jaycees, as a social service organization with otherwise broad and un-
selective membership criteria, lacked "the distinctive characteristics
that might afford constitutional protection to the decision of its mem-
bers to exclude women."'1 16 The rule in Roberts was amplified a decade
and a half later in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.'1 7 In Dale, the Court
struck down the application of a New Jersey anti-discrimination statute
that would have required the Scouts to retain "an avowed homosexual
and gay rights activist"""S as a scout leader because it violated the
members' freedom of expressive association.' ' I The Court stated, "It
seems indisputable that an association that seeks to transmit such a
system of values [e.g., trustworthiness, loyalty, helpfulness, friendli-
ness, courtesy, kindness, cheerfulness, thriftiness, bravery, cleanliness,
and reverence] engages in expressive activity."' '2
Both Roberts and Dale stand for the proposition that an organiza-
tion may discriminate when its identity is at stake, and that such dis-
crimination is protected against government interference under the
mantle of the First Amendment right of association. The extent of
this protection depends on many factors, including the "size, purpose,
policies, selectivity, [and] congeniality" of the organization and on
how important the prohibited practice is to furthering the goals of the
112 See id. at 559.
113 Id. at 581.
114 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
115 See id. at 621.
116 Id.
117 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
118 Id. at 644.
119 Id. at 661.
120 Id. at 650.
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organization. '2 While the right of association may protect certain fa-
milial relationships against the application of anti-discrimination laws,
for instance, it may not protect a "large business enterprise."'122 Just as
the Jaycees were not allowed to discriminate on the basis of sex (as the
interest protected was not sufficiently related to the Jaycees' mission as
a social service group), so the Boy Scouts were allowed to discriminate
on the basis of sexual orientation (as the interest protected was cen-
tral to the Scouts' mission as a group dedicated to the formation of
young men). Thus, as administrators of a Catholic university may be-
lieve that the hiring of Catholics is necessary to maintain the univer-
sity's Catholic identity, the right of association suggests a
constitutional right to discriminate based on religion. When coupled
with the free exercise claim, this argument should satisfy the excep-
tion noted in Smith, thus meriting strict scrutiny of a state's anti-dis-
crimination law that takes aim at a religious school's employment
practices.
A hybrid claim may also be established by relying on the Estab-
lishment Clause as that "other constitutional protection[ ]" de-
manded by Smith.' 2 1 A religious employer may argue, for example,
that even the attempt to enforce an anti-discrimination law would ex-
cessively entangle church and state. The U.S. Supreme Court, in
Aguilar v. Felton, 124 found that "pervasive monitoring by public author-
ities in the sectarian schools infringes precisely on those Establish-
ment Clause values at the root of the prohibition of excessive
entanglement."'2 5 In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 21' the Court
cautioned that "[i] t is not only the conclusions that may be reached by
[an agency] which may impinge on rights guaranteed by the Religion
Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry leading to findings and
conclusions."' 27 Thus, if the religious employer can show that an at-
tempt to enforce an anti-discrimination law would lead to excessive
entanglement between the government and the religious body, a hy-
brid claim that satisfies the Smith exception could be brought forth as
a defense.
121 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620-21.
122 Id. at 620.
123 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
124 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
125 Id. at 413.
126 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
127 Id. at 502.
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C. The Establishment Clause
Another vehicle for attaining an exemption from Title VII is of-
fered through the Establishment Clause itself.'2 8 The Supreme Court
has held that this clause prohibits all governmental bodies from either
favoring a particular religion'2 9 or aiding religion in general,131 al-
though government bodies "may (and sometimes must) accommo-
date religious practices."''" Which factors the Court considers when
applying the Establishment Clause are not entirely clear. Even before
the Court's most recent forays into this jurisprudential jungle in
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris' 3 2 and Mitchell v. Helms,'3 the famous
Lemon' 3 4 test had come under fire from several of the Justices. Justice
Souter, for example, has commented that despite "all the years of its
effort, the Court has isolated no single test of constitutional suffi-
ciency" for judging certain Establishment Clause claims.'13 5 Justice
Scalia went a good deal further, expressing agreement with the "long
list of constitutional scholars who have criticized Lemon and
bemoaned the strange Establishment Clause geometry of crooked
lines and wavering shapes its intermittent use has produced." 13 6 Jus-
tice Kennedy opined a decade ago that Lemon should not be the "pri-
mary guide" in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.13 7 Chief Justice
Rehnquist once wrote that Lemon has "no more grounding in the his-
128 U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion .... ).
129 See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-46 (1982) (holding that the Es-
tablishment Clause's "clearest command" is "that one religious denomination cannot
be officially preferred over another"); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)
(applying the Establishment Clause to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment).
130 . See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963)
(claiming the Court had "rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establish-
ment Clause forbids only governmental preference of one religion over another");
Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 (ruling that neither state nor federal government may pass laws
aiding one religion or all religions).
131 Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705-06 (1994) (providing that the gov-
ernment "may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices ... without
violating the Establishment Clause" (citations omitted)). The Court also stated that
states can provide "benevolent neutrality" to religious practices "without sponsorship
and without interference." Id. at 705.
132 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
133 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
134 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
135 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 869 (Souter, J., dissenting).
136 Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399
(1993) (ScaliaJ., concurring).
137 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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tory of the First Amendment than does the wall theory upon which it
rests. ' ' 8 Justice O'Connor has exhibited discomfort with the Lemon
test, issuing a "clarification" of it in 19841'19 and discussing it again in a
concurrence ten years later.'14
Notwithstanding the fact that at least two other tests, or at least
"refinements" of Lemon, have been proposed, 41 and despite the fact
that some commentators have argued that the Lemon test did not sur-
vive Mitchell,'42 the plurality's explicit reference to the Lemon test in
Mitchell14 3 indicates that Lemon is not dead. It could even be argued
that Mitchell clarifies Establishment Clause doctrine, albeit narrowly.
The Mitchell plurality noted it was inquiring into only one of Lemon's
three elements, i.e., the law's effect, as the "secular purpose" and "ex-
cessive entanglement" prongs were not in dispute. 144 The significance
of Mitchell, then, lies in the manner in which the plurality interpreted
the "effect" prong of the Lemon test-namely, asking whether the law
would result "in religious indoctrination by the government" or
whether those directly benefiting from the law would be "define [d] by
reference to religion."1 45 In any event, given the mercurial status of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, this Article will examine relig-
ious exemptions to anti-discrimination laws under multiple tests.
Under Lemon, a law will run afoul of the Establishment Clause if it
fails to pass any one of the test's three prongs. First, it must have a
"secular legislative purpose";146 second, its principal effect must be
one that "neither advances nor inhibits religion"; 147 and third, it must
not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion." 48
In Agostini v. Felton,149 the Court essentially "folded the entanglement
138 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
139 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
140 See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718-21 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
141 Justice O'Connor explains the "endorsement" test in her concurrences in
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring), and County of Allegheny, 492
U.S. at 627-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy's dissent in the latter
case contains his suggested "coercion" test, id. at 655-67 (Kennedy, J., dissenting),
and his majority opinion in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), explains it in more
detail.
142 See, e.g., Steven K. Green, The Ambiguity of Neutrality, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 692,
708 (2001).
143 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807-08 (2000).
144 Id.
145 Id. at 808.
146 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
149 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
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inquiry into the primary effect inquiry," as "both inquiries rely on the
same evidence and [because] the degree of entanglement has impli-
cations for whether a statute advances or inhibits religion."'
'5
Employing the Lemon test, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
religious exemption to Title VII in a 1987 case, Corp. of the Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos.1 5 1 In
Amos, the Court held that "determining whether an activity is religious
or secular ... results in considerable ongoing government entangle-
ment" with religious matters. 15 2 As Justice O'Connor explained, the
Section 702 exemption represents "a [g]overnment decision to lift
from a nonprofit activity of a religious organization the burden of
demonstrating that the particular nonprofit activity is religious as well
as the burden of refraining from discriminating on the basis of the
religion."' 53 According to this line of reasoning, the Court found that
not allowing a religious exemption from Title VII would violate the
Establishment Clause.
This rule was subsequently applied in many cases, including some
involving Catholic universities. In Maguire v. Marquette University, 54
for instance, a federal district court refused to pursue an inquiry into
whether a rejected candidate for a position as a theology professor "is
or is not a Catholic," as such a question was "one the First Amend-
ment leaves to theology departments and church officials, not federal
judges."1
55
Likewise, in EEOC v. Catholic University of America, 1 56 a three-judge
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found
that the application of Title VII to a religious sister's sex discrimina-
tion claim would impermissibly entangle church and state in violation
of the Establishment Clause. The court also found that as the nun's
position as a teacher of church law was "the functional equivalent of a
minister," the Free Exercise clause prohibited judicial review of a
Catholic university's decision not to grant her tenure.
15 7
150 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2476 (2002) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring) (citations omitted).
151 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
152 Id. at 343 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613).
153 Id. at 348-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
154 627 F. Supp. 1499 (E.D. Wis. 1986), affd, 814 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir. 1987).
155 Id. at 1503; see also LARRY WITHAM, CURRAN VS. CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY: A STUDY
OF AUTHORITY AND FREEDOM IN CONFLIC' 265 (1991) (recounting Judge Frederick
Weisberg's aversion to the prospect of a court demanding a religious school hire a
particular individual to teach theology against the express will of the institution).
156 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
157 Id. at 457.
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Similarly, in Little v. Wuerl,'' 8 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit refused to apply Title VII's prohibition against religious
discrimination to a Catholic school 5-9 which had failed to renew the
contract of one of its non-Catholic teachers because of the teacher's
divorce and remarriage."!" The court held that applying Title VII to
the school's decision would be "suspect because it arguably would cre-
ate excessive government entanglement with religion in violation of
the establishment clause."l''
These cases demonstrate that the most likely reading of the Estab-
lishment Clause in this context would prohibitjudicial interference in
an employment-related decision by administrators of a Catholic uni-
versity. Yet even the alternative readings of the Establishment Clause
(as applied to a religious exemption for certain kinds of employment
discrimination) do not imperil the same result. Under one of two
possible alternatives to Lemon the Court has used, the "endorsement"
test proposed by justice O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly,'"2 government
action is unconstitutional if its "actual purpose is to endorse or disap-
prove of religion" or "in fact conveys a message of endorsement or
disapproval."I"" In Lynch, the Court held that a Christmas creche in a
city park did neither, given that other holiday displays were placed
alongside the Christmas creche and that such displays had been used
for so long that members of the public would not find the practice to
be an endorsement of religion.164 Under this reading of the Establish-
ment Clause, assuming it applies in the context of exemptions for ed-
ucational institutions, one could fairly argue that Congress's intent
158 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991).
159 Id. at 951.
160 Id. at 946.
161 Id. at 948 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)); see also Bishop
Leonard Reg'I Catholic Sch. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 593 A.2d 28, 33-34
(Pa. 1991) (holding that a teacher who had violated a faculty handbook by entering
into a second marriage without an annulment was considered to have breached her
contract and was thus ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits, despite
claim of Establishment Clause violation by the defendant).
162 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
163 Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
164 See id. at 692-94 (O'ConnorJ., concurring). Some constitutional law scholars
reason that long-accepted practices which would be otherwise suspect are sometimes
permitted because history has shown "no significant danger of eroding governmental
neutrality regarding religious matters." JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 1166 (4th ed. 1991). Another scholar attributes this permissive atti-
tude to a gradual loss of the uniquely religious significance of the practice. See
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1224 (2d ed. 1988).
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behind the Title VII exemption was simply to accommodate religious
practice, and not to either "endorse" or "approve" it.
165
The third version of the Establishment Clause has been termed
the "coercion" test,' 66 which guarantees that "government may not co-
erce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or
otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious
faith, or tends to do so.'"" 67 While the Court held that a school-spon-
sored prayer violated this test, 168 it is unlikely (given precedent) that a
court would hold as coercive an exemption for religiously motivated
conduct at an avowedly religious educational institution. It is possible,
of course, that a court might arrive at a different result if the case
involved a nominally religious school, given the fact that a person's
livelihood could hinge on his or her conformity with religious
doctrine.16
Even if one concludes that allowing religious institutions to prac-
tice religious discrimination infringes upon the Establishment Clause,
some scholars have argued that free exercise accommodations serve as
a "carve out" exception to the Establishment Clause, or at the very
least as a middle ground that is neither mandated by the Free Exercise
Clause nor prohibited by the Establishment Clause.1
70
In any event, nothing in either the Free Exercise Clause or the
Establishment Clause appears to block administrators of an unapo-
logetically Catholic university from discriminating on the basis of re-
ligion when making employment-related decisions. In fact, as has
been made clear in Parts II.B and II.C, both clauses afford ample pro-
tection to universities from both state and federal claims. In addition,
as Part II.A has discussed, universities are protected by federal statute
under the exemptions in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The veracity
of this theory is evident upon an examination of the case law.
III. CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE CASE LAW
Dozens of cases have appeared in the reporters that have involved
judicial review of an employment decision made by a religious institu-
165 See generally Jennifer Mary Burman, Comment, Corporation of Presiding
Bishop v. Amos: The Supreme Court and Religious Discrimination by Religious Educational
Institutions, 3 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 629 (1988).
166 The "coercion" test was first employed by the Supreme Court in Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
167 Id. at 587 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
168 See id. at 599.
169 See, e.g., Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 803 F.2d 351, 353-54 (7th Cir. 1986).
170 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
62 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 900 (1994).
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tion. 171 Fewer have dealt directly with review of decisions by adminis-
trators of Catholic universities. 172 Nevertheless, extant cases
universally stand for the proposition that Catholic universities seeking
to preserve their Catholic identity by hiring Catholic faculty may do
SO.
In EEOC v. Mississippi College, 173 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit ruled that a defendant's preference for hiring adherents
of a particular religion was a bona fide occupational qualification, in
part because the defendant was a "pervasively sectarian" institution.1 74
Conversely, in EEOC v. Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate,175 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to apply Title VII ex-
emptions to a school, as "[t]he ownership and affiliation, purpose,
faculty, student body, student activities, and curriculum" was "either
essentially secular, or neutral as far as religion is concerned."'17.  Far
from signaling an end to religious exemptions,177 Kamehameha simply
stands as a warning for schools that are considering dropping their
religious affiliation, as their latitude in making future hiring decisions
may be affected by such an action. For Catholic universities that ad-
here to Canon Law and the norms of Ex Corde Ecclesiae,' 78 this danger
is nonexistent.
A school should be just as anxious to spell out what is required
from its employees in terms of its religious identity. In Vigars v. Valley
Christian Center of Dublin, ' 79 a federal district court refused to exempt a
religious school from Title VII requirements because it did not prove
that an employee's out-of-wedlock birth impaired her ability to func-
tion as a role model.I"" The court held that a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ) requires a showing that "the person's job must
depend upon the discriminatory characteristic."' 8 ' Likewise, in Dolter
171 See supra Part II.
172 See, e.g., infra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
173 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980).
174 Id. at 487.
175 990 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1993).
176 Id. at 461.
177 The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Kamehameha has been roundly criticized on these
grounds. See, e.g., Araujo, supra note 46, at 742-54.
178 See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
179 805 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
180 See id. at 808.
181 Id.; see also UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201-03 (1991) (hold-
ing that in order for a discriminatory job qualification to qualify as a bona fide occu-
pational qualification, it must "affect an employee's ability to do the job," and "must
relate to the 'essence' or to the 'central mission of the employer's business'" (cita-
tions omitted)).
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v. Wahlert High School,'8 2 a Catholic high school fired an English
teacher who had become pregnant while yet unmarried.18 3 The fed-
eral district court, in denying the school's motion for summary judg-
ment, found that the employer had failed to prove that adherence to
Catholic moral teaching was a BFOQ for the teacher's position.
8 4
Consistent with these cases is Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club,'8 5 in which
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit accepted a BFOQ
defense. In Chambers, the Girls Club showed that counseling teenage
girls about birth control was central to an employee's duties and justi-
fied the firing of an employee who had become pregnant out of wed-
lock.'8 6 These cases illustrate the point that a school is much better
off-legally and practically-if it gives its employees fair notice of
what is expected of them vis-d-vis the school's mission and identity. 11
7
Courts have applied the same law to Catholic universities claim-
ing a right to engage in employment discrimination on religious
grounds. s8 8 For example, in Scheiber v. St. John's University,18 9 the
Court of Appeals of New York ruled against a Catholic university
which claimed it was exempt from a state anti-discrimination law. St.
John's fired Donald Scheiber, its Vice-President of Student Life with
182 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980).
183 See id. at 267.
184 See id. at 271-72.
185 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987).
186 See id. at 701-02.
187 SeeJohn Owens, Professors Schools' Faith-Based Doctrines Raise Concerns, Risk Back-
lash, CmI. TRIB., Oct. 6, 2002, at I (pointing out that there are approximately one
hundred "evangelical Christian schools nationwide that require instructors to commit
either verbally or orally to faith-based doctrines"). The impact of these faith-based
statements on a school's accreditation status or eligibility for federal aid is beyond the
scope of this Article. For an insightful discussion of these topics, see Gerard V. Brad-
ley, Legal Beagle: ECE'sBest Friend May Be the Civil Law, Address at Ex Corde Eccle-
siae: A Conversation "From the Heart of the Church", Catholic University of America
(Sept. 18, 1999) (transcript available at http://excorde.cua.edu/Bradley.shtml (last
visited Apr. 2, 2003)).
188 Curiously, some schools choose not to employ this defense, even when they are
entitled to it. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 471 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (Henderson, J., concurring) (noting that "the insulating effect of the First
Amendment's religion clauses was never felt by defendant The Catholic University of
America (CUA) until the district court's post-trial, and apparently sua sponte, request
for briefs 'addressing the question whether the First Amendment precludes mainte-
nance and adjudication of Sister McDonough's claims'"); Tagatz v. Marquette Univ.,
861 F.2d 1040, 1043 (7th Cir. 1988) ("But [defendant Marquette's] stated policy is
not to discriminate against non-Catholics once they are hired; and whether because of
this policy or otherwise, Marquette declined to plead the religious exemption as a
defense to [plaintiff] Dr. Tagatz's claim of religious discrimination.").
189 638 N.E.2d 977 (N.Y. 1994).
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twenty years of service at the school.'t °11 Scheiber alleged he had been
fired because he wasJewish, and sued. In its defense, St.John's relied,
among other things, on a statutory exemption permitting "any relig-
ious or denominational institution or organization ... [to give] pref-
erence to persons of the same religion or denomination [and may
take] such action as is calculated by such organization to promote the
religious principles for which it is established or maintained."' 9'
The court, however, observed that the law did not contain a blan-
ket exemption for religious organizations, granting them "license...
to engage in wholesale discrimination."' 9 2 Rather, the exemption was
a narrow one allowing for employment preferences when necessary to
promote the religious principles of the institution. Thus, the court
held that "[a] religious employer may not discriminate against an indi-
vidual for reasons having nothing to do with the free exercise of relig-
ion and then invoke the exemption as a shield against its unlawful
conduct. "' In denying the university's summary judgment motion,
the court directed the adjudication of the disputed factual issue of
whether St. John's was actually exercising the preference allowed by
the statute or engaging in the unlawful discrimination alleged by the
plaintiff.'9 4 Had St. John's followed the general norms of Ex Corde
Ecclesiae, the likelihood of Mr. Scheiber's filing suit, let alone surviving
summary judgment, would have been questionable at best.
Another example from the case law illustrating judicial respect
for employment decisions by authentically religious universities is
Pime v. Loyola University of Chicago. '5 In Pime, ajewish philosophy pro-
fessor sued a Jesuit university, alleging religious discrimination in vio-
lation of Title VII. The school argued in its defense that having a
'Jesuit presence" in its philosophy department was a BFOQ. -'1 The
court agreed, noting that Loyola had "a long Jesuit tradition,"'9 7 and
that 'Jesuit 'presence' is important to the successful operation of the
university."' 98 The court held that earmarking seven out of the thirty-
190 See id. at 978.
191 Scheiber v. St. John's Univ., 600 N.Y.S.2d 734, 738 (App. Div. 1993) (Rosen-
blatt,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(11)
(Consol. 2002)).
192 Scheiber, 638 N.E.2d at 980.
193 Id.
194 See id. Somewhat confusedly, perhaps, St. John's had identified itself as an
"equal opportunity employer." [(.
195 803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1986).
196 Id. at 351-52.
197 Id. at 352.
198 Id. at 353.
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one teaching positions in the philosophy department forJesuits was "a
reasonable determination," ' and that
[i]t appears to be significant to the educational tradition and char-
acter of the institution that students be assured a degree of contact
with teachers who have received the training and accepted the obli-
gations which are essential to membership in the Society ofJesus. It
requires more to be a Jesuit than just adherence to the Catholic
faith, and it seems wholly reasonable to believe that the educational
experience at Loyola would be different if Jesuit presence were not
maintained. As priests, Jesuits perform rites and sacraments, and
counsel members of the university community, including students,
faculty, and staff. One witness expressed the objective as keeping a
presence "so that students would occasionally encounter a
Jesuit. "200
As discussed in Part II.A, Judge Posner warned in his concurring
opinion in Pime that if the defendant began to soft-pedal its religious
identity, it may not be entitled to claim a Title VII exemption:
If Loyola, perhaps in order to attract financial or other support
from non-Catholic sources, has attenuated its relationship to theJes-
uit order far beyond that of other Catholic universities, there would
be a serious problem in holding that it could nevertheless discrimi-
nate freely in favor of Catholics; for remember that the exemption
allows the religious employer to confine all hiring to members of one
religious faith.
2 0'
One final case deserves special mention, as it encapsulates many
of the principles involved in religious employment discrimination dis-
cussed in this Article; namely, (1) that the law in this country affords
extraordinary protection for religious employers wishing to discrimi-
nate on religious grounds; (2) that courts are extremely reluctant to
second-guess religion-related employment decisions made by adminis-
trators of religious schools; (3) that many bishops and administrators
of Catholic universities appear to be either ignorant of their rights in
this regard or somehow reluctant to exercise them; and (4) that the
fears of legal liability over implementing the mandatum requirement
that Ex Corde Ecclesiae imposes on Catholic theologians are vastly
overblown.
In EEOC v. Catholic University of America,2 112 a Dominican nun
brought a Title VII sex discrimination action against the Catholic Uni-
versity of America (CUA) after she was rejected for a tenured post in
199 Id. at 354.
200 Id. at 353-54.
201 Id. at 358 (Posner, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
202 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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CUA's Canon Law department.1  Even though Cardinal James A.
Hickey, the Archbishop of Washington and ex officio the CUA Chan-
cellor, referred to this dispute as a "purely internal, non-ecclesiastical,
academic matter," and even though CUA's attorneys did not raise the
constitutional issues at trial, the district judge felt compelled by the
legal issues involved to address sua sponte CUA's constitutional
rights. 2°1 4 After the one-week trial had concluded, the judge dismissed
the case without reaching the merits, concluding that "application of
Title VII to [the facts and relationships] would violate both the Free
Exercise and the Establishment Clauses. 2°1 5 Specifically, the trial
judge found that as (the plaintiff) Sr. McDonough's "primary role in
the Department of Canon Law was the functional equivalent of the
task of a minister," CUA was entitled to discriminate in its employ-
ment decisions by virtue of an exemption for religious employers
under Title VII.
206
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed
the trial court's decision,2°1 7 but considerably expounded on the ratio-
nale supporting CUA's cause. The appellate panel's majority decision
averred that CUA, as a religious organization, had a free exercise right
to "decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of
church government as well as those of faith and doctrine." 21 8 Moreo-
ver, the court asserted, CUA had a right to invoke the so-called "minis-
terial exception" under Title VII jurisprudence, which "precludes civil
courts from adjudicating employment discrimination suits by minis-
ters [or their functional equivalents] against the church or religious
institution employing them."219 The court went on to assert the con-
tinued viability of the "ministerial exception" after the Supreme
Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith2t1 and even provided a
"hybrid" analysis as an alternative argument for CUA's right to have
anti-employment laws subjected to strict scrutiny.
2 1 1
203 id. at 457.
204 Id. at 471 (Henderson, J., concurring).
205 EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 856 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1994), affd, 83 F.3d
455.
206 Id. at 10.
207 Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 470.
208 Id. at 460 (quoting Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)).
209 Id. at 461 (citing, inter alia, Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Ad-
ventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological
Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th
Cir. 1972)).
210 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
211 Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 462-63.
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The appellate panel, like the district judge, found that applying
Title VII to CUA would impermissibly entangle the government with
religion, as it required the court to opine on "questions of religious
doctrine, polity, and practice" and to ascertain the plaintiffs qualifica-
tions to "teach in the name of the Church. '212 The trial judge had
expressly noted a strong aversion to engaging in ajudicial inquiry that
would have required him "to choose between [the witnesses'] compet-
ing religious visions. ' 213 In sum, the D.C. Circuit opinion in EEOC v.
CUA is a tour deforce of the rights of a Catholic university to engage in
religious employment discrimination. What is (perhaps) even more
remarkable about this decision, however, is the extent to which the
majority gleaned the record for evidence that CUA actually made re-
ligion a relevant consideration in the decision not to grant tenure to
Sr. McDonough-an effort that did not go unnoticed by the panel's
third member, who was prompted to write a concurrence calling at-
tention to CUA's apparent reluctance to assert its own rights.2 14
CONCLUSION
The precepts of Canon Law and the norms of Ex Corde Ecclesiae
are clear. In order to be considered a Catholic university by the Cath-
olic Church, administrators of the school must abide by church law.
This requires them to engage in certain kinds of employment discrim-
ination-on religious grounds-in order to protect the identity and
mission of the university entrusted to their care. If bishops or admin-
istrators are reluctant, for whatever reason, to engage in proper em-
ployment discrimination on religious grounds, they have no basis for
blaming the American legal system in general or plaintiff lawyers in
particular.
The case law suggests that the failure to follow these require-
ments, not the satisfaction of them, is what threatens a university's
legal budget, let alone its identity. Whereas the schools in
Kamehameha and Scheiber subjected themselves to liability when they
distanced themselves from an established church or failed to vigilantly
maintain their religious identity, the schools in Pime and Catholic Uni-
versity of America enjoyed more protection under the mantle of the
Catholic Church. Under either the religious exemptions of Title VII
212 Id. at 465-66.
213 Id. at 466.
214 Id. at 471 (Henderson, J., concurring).
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or the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, religious institutions
have more than enough protection to make employment decisions on
religious grounds.
2 15
215 See Douglas Laycock, The Rights of Religious Academic Communities, 20J.C. & U.L.
15, 33 (1993); see also Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses:
The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1373, 1373 (1981) (arguing that "churches have a constitutionally protected interest
in managing their own institutions free of government interference").
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